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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous studies have examined the manipulation of executive stock option awards and 
exercises, focusing on information timing by managers. In this paper, we investigate 
managerial manipulation of stock-price performance motivated by stock options. To distinguish 
performance manipulation from information timing, we examine stock returns surrounding the 
departure of retiring CEOs, whose option holdings typically expire shortly after their departure 
and whose chances to manipulate option awards and exercises are minimized. Consistent with 
manipulated performance, we find significant abnormal stock returns in the months 
surrounding CEO departure for those with strong option incentives, which are reversed shortly 
after CEO departure. 
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1.  Introduction 
The use of stock options in executive compensation has increased dramatically over the 
past few decades, but the role of executive stock options remains open to debate. Some argue 
that stock options provide an important incentive scheme for corporate managers and help 
firms retain key employees. On the other hand, there is an increasing concern among academics 
and the public that executive stock options are costly to shareholders and motivate executives 
to behave opportunistically. Opportunistic managerial behaviors can be divided into two 
categories. In the first category, executives opportunistically time option awards and exercises: 
they manage to receive option grants before the release of favorable information on the 
company (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Bebchuk et al., 2010), or they choose to exercise options and 
sell their shares at favorable times to realize high profits (e.g., Aboody et al., 2008; Cicero, 
2009). Such opportunistic behaviors rely on executives’ private information about the firm and 
hence are referred to as information timing. In the second category, executives directly 
manipulate corporate performance: by taking actions to temporarily elevate the company’s 
share value, executives maximize capital gains from exercising stock options at high share 
prices. Unlike information timing, such opportunistic behavior induces managers to directly 
manipulate corporate decisions or take other actions to influence share value in the short term. 
In this study, we focus on the effect of this type of managerial opportunistic behavior and 
document evidence on manipulated performance motivated by executive stock option 
exercises. 
Prior studies identify a link between corporate decision manipulation and executive stock 
options. For instance, Bergstresser and Phillippon (2006) document that managers with more 
option and stock holdings are more likely to manipulate reported earnings through 
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discretionary accruals; Efendi et al. (2007) observe a higher likelihood of a misstated financial 
statement when the CEO has sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options; Aboody and 
Kasznik (2000) study scheduled option grants and find that managers time their voluntary 
disclosures by accelerating bad news and delaying good news around the option grant date. 
These studies confirm that stock options motivate executives to manipulate corporate decisions. 
1 However, without direct evidence on manipulated stock-price performance, these studies do 
not answer the following questions: Can executives effectively manipulate stock price (or is 
there evidence of manipulated stock returns)? If the answer is yes, can executives acquire 
economically significant benefit from manipulated stock-price performance? 
We address these issues in a unique setting: we examine stock-price performance for a 
sample of firms over a period surrounding CEO retirement. By dividing retiring CEOs into two 
groups, one with high-option incentives and the other with low-option incentives, we compare 
abnormal stock returns between the two groups. 
Our empirical strategy is based on the following considerations. As our data show, retiring 
CEOs often have sizable option holdings in their final year in office and thus exercise 
significantly more options in the final year than in previous years. Because unexercised stock 
options are expected to lapse shortly after departure,2 retiring CEOs should have unusually 
                                                          
1 Aboody and Kasznik (2000) document abnormal stock returns from voluntary disclosure timing. 
Such an effect is broadly consistent with the manipulation effect we examine though it does not 
necessarily cause stock-price reversal. 
2 Firms usually allow a post-retirement period of 60 to 90 days for option exercises. In recent years, 
some firms such as Disney have further extended the time for post-retirement option exercises. For non-
retirement departures, firms often specify that stock options terminate on the last day of employment 
(e.g., Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.).  
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strong option incentives, and option-induced behaviors should be evident with such CEOs. In 
particular, as any effect of option-motivated decisions by an outgoing CEO must show up in 
the months or years surrounding his departure, there is a clear performance window that allows 
us to trace the role of his option incentives. This is a distinct advantage of our approach, since it 
is usually difficult to identify a performance window for non-retiring CEOs. Restrictions on 
vesting and exercising stock options determine the long-term nature of option incentives, and 
managerial behaviors change according to complex time-varying structures of unexercised 
options and expiration dates that are not observed by econometricians. Moreover, their 
behaviors also depend on their expectation of future option grants. Hence, for non-retiring 
CEOs, there is no simple link between a given year’s performance and their option status in 
that year or some early years. In addition, the unique performance window in our setting allows 
us to identify manipulated performance without being concerned with information timing by 
managers. For normal retirement, the CEO’s departure is typically predetermined and the 
timing of departure is difficult to manipulate shortly before the event. Therefore, with limited 
chance for information timing, the outgoing CEO can only manipulate the share price to 
increase capital gains from his terminal-period option exercises. 
We divide our sample of retiring CEOs into a high-option holding group and a low-option 
holding group based on their unexercised options at the time one year before their departure. 
After matching for size and book-to-market between the two groups, we compare their 
industry-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the two-year period from one 
year before until one year after CEO departure. We find an inverted V-shaped difference in 
BHAR between the two groups: the abnormal return is higher for the high-option group than 
for the low-option group, and the difference peaks in the month of CEO departure at a level of 
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as high as 13 percentage points. After CEO departure, the difference diminishes and quickly 
become insignificant.  
Our finding indicates a temporary positive effect of executive stock options on stock price 
that is reversed shortly after the CEO leaves office. This effect coincides with the fact that 
CEOs exercise an unusually high number of options in their final year in office. Our finding 
cannot be explained by firm heterogeneity, CEO heterogeneity, or any market-related variables. 
We view our finding as evidence of manipulated stock-price performance that helps the retiring 
CEO maximize capital gains from his terminal option exercises. The economic benefit the CEO 
can capture is economically significant. Under the assumption that a quarter of the retiring 
CEO’s unexercised exercisable options in the final year are exercised in the month of his 
departure, the average abnormal capital gains to the CEO would be as high as $2.3 million. 
The share price revision in the post-CEO departure period is a strong indication of 
performance manipulation. We then further examine some corporate decisions in the years 
surrounding CEO retirement, including accruals, R&D expenditure, seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs), and repurchases that may directly affect the share price. We find mixed evidence of 
manipulation of such decisions. Before CEO departure, firms in the high-option group are less 
likely to conduct SEOs and, with weaker evidence, more likely to repurchase shares. Both 
decision preferences are associated with an immediate upward effect on the share value that 
helps the retiring manager exit from his option positions. On the other hand, consistent with 
previous studies regarding horizon problems facing retiring CEOs, we find no evidence of 
option-induced earnings management or R&D expenditure reduction in the final years. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and our research 
strategy. Section 3 describes the data we use in this study. Section 4 presents our main 
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empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2.   Background and Research Method 
2.1.   Related Literature 
Stock options have become increasingly important in executive compensation contracts. 
Based on the Black-Sholes value, executive stock options have become the most important 
component of managerial incentives (see Hall and Liebman, 1998; Murphy, 1999). A number 
of previous studies have examined various issues regarding executive stock options. These 
issues can be divided into two broad lines of research that address two important and closely 
related research questions: How are executive stock options awarded? Do executive stock 
options affect firm performance? 
To answer the first question, Yermack (1995) examines determinants of option grants to 
CEOs and finds little evidence that option grants follow the optimal compensation practices 
suggested by theory. He concludes that cross-sectional variations in option grants are not well 
explained by agency theory or financial contract theory. More recently, Hall and Murphy 
(2003) explore problems with the wide use of executive stock options. They argue that options 
are often an inefficient way to attract and motivate corporate executives, and that options are 
overused because boards and managers falsely perceive stock options to be inexpensive. 
Narayanan and Seyhun (2008) document evidence of a dating game that entails picking a grant 
date after the board’s compensation decision is made. Bebchuk et al. (2010) find that CEOs 
receive an abnormally high number of “lucky” grants that are awarded at the lowest price of the 
grant month. 
Other studies in this line examine the link between stock option awards and corporate 
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decisions. Yermack (1997) finds that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before 
favorable corporate news, which is interpreted as evidence of managers’ influence on the 
compensation committee to award them options at favorable times. By studying scheduled 
option grants, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) document evidence that managers time their 
voluntary disclosures by accelerating bad news and delaying good news around the option 
grant date. Hanlon et al. (2003) find that the predicted component of option grant value 
attributable to economic determinants exhibits a strong positive relation with future earnings. 
Ittner et al. (2003) examine the use of options in new economy firms and observe that lower 
than expected option grants are associated with lower accounting performance in the two 
subsequent years. 
More recent studies examine opportunistic executive behavior in option exercises. 
Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find evidence that corporate insiders use private information to 
time the exercises of their executive stock options. Aboody et al. (2008) document strong 
evidence that executives are exploiting positive private information when they exercise the 
options but hold the shares obtained beyond a certain period. Cicero (2009) examines different 
option exercise strategies executives use and finds that by manipulating option exercises, 
executives use private information to increase the profitability of different option exercise 
strategies. 
The second research question involves a more fundamental issue: Do executive stock 
options ultimately work in the best interest of shareholders, regardless of how options are 
awarded? Direct studies on this issue are scarce, in part because the long-term incentive nature 
of stock options makes it difficult to link stock-price performance to a previous time’s option 
grants or holdings. The literature on the ownership-performance relationship is related to this 
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issue. In their influential work, Morck et al. (1988) document evidence that higher managerial 
ownership, except at very high levels, is associated with better company performance. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) show that this relationship is non-monotonic. Mehran (1995) 
reports that firm performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers 
and to the percentage of their compensation that is equity-based. Core and Larcker (2002) find 
that firms’ operation performance improves following the establishment of a target ownership 
plan. On the other hand, other researchers, including Demsetz and Lehn (1985), argue that 
firms and managers contract optimally and, on average, equity incentives are set at the value-
maximizing levels and hence there should be no systematic relations between managerial 
equity ownership and corporate performance.  
Recent studies in the accounting literature examine the dysfunctional behavior of 
management association with the use of stock options. Because reported earnings may affect 
stock price movement in the short term, managers may have an incentive to manipulate 
earnings so that they can benefit from exercising options at high share prices. Several recent 
studies examine this proposition. Cheng and Warfield (2005) document that managers with 
high equity are more likely to engage in earnings management and reporting earnings that meet 
or beat analysts’ forecasts. Bergstresser and Phillippon (2006) find that managers holding more 
options and stock shares are more likely to manipulate reported earnings through discretionary 
accruals. Burns and Kedia (2006) observe that the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio to 
stock price is positively correlated to the propensity to misreport. Efendi et al. (2007) find that 
the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases when the CEO has sizable holdings 
of in-the-money stock options.  
These findings are consistent with those of Bartov and Mohanram (2004) and Bergstresser 
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and Phillippon (2006), who identify a link between option exercises and earnings management. 
Bartov and Mohanram focus on large exercises of executive stock options, where the incentive 
for private-information-based exercises is suspected to be high. They find that abnormally 
positive earnings performance in the pre-exercise period turns to disappointing earnings 
performance in the post-exercise period. Bergstresser and Phillippon find that CEOs exercise 
unusually large numbers of options and sell large quantities of shares during years of high 
accruals. 
This literature suggests two possibilities: managers possess private information and 
accordingly “passively” time option awards and exercises, or they “actively” manipulate share 
price via earnings management, to maximize their private benefits. These two possibilities 
imply different causal relations regarding the option scheme. The first possibility points to 
managers’ opportunistic behavior in timing option grants and exercises, but it has no 
implication for potential performance effects of stock options. The second possibility suggests 
that stop options play a role in motivating executives to directly manipulate corporate 
performance. Previous studies do not directly identify the effect of executive stock options on 
stock price performance. Indeed, it is difficult to estimate this effect. Because of the long-term 
nature of option incentives and intertemporal variation in stock option awards and the vesting 
process, there is no simple link between option grants or holdings at one time and a subsequent 
option exercise at another time. Therefore, those studies do not determine whether executives 
can effectively manipulate stock-price performance and whether they can obtain economically 
significant benefits from suspected performance manipulation. 
2.2.   Research Method 
We focus on the stock-price performance for a sample of firms with a retiring CEO. To 
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identify normal retirement-based departures, we follow previous studies (e.g., Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993) and consider a departure as normal retirement if the CEO was 64 or older 
when he left office. We divide such CEOs into two groups, one with high-option holdings and 
the other with low-option holdings. After controlling for market capitalization and the book-to-
market ratio, we compare industry-adjusted abnormal stock returns between the two groups for 
one year before and one year after CEO departure.  
In this approach, we use CEO age at departure above 64 as the criterion for identifying a 
normal retirement. This criterion is clearly imperfect since a CEO may retire at a younger age 
while a forced departure may occur with an older CEO. On the other hand, according to the 
indicated reason for CEO departure recorded in the ExecuComp database, this age criterion 
works well in highlighting normal retirements. For our sample, among the CEOs who departed 
at age above 64, close to 80% of the departures are specified as retired. This high percentage 
applies to both the low- and high-option holding groups. In contrast, for CEOs departed at age 
below 60, only 28% of the departures are specified as retired.3 
Our study has distinct features in contrast to previous studies on the effects of executive 
stock options. First, retiring CEOs typically have sizeable option holdings in their final year in 
office, and they exercise significantly more options in the final year than in previous years. 
Because any unexercised stock options will lapse soon after retirement, retiring CEOs are 
expected to have strong option incentives. Therefore, if stock options play an important role in 
managerial motivation, this role should be particularly evident with retiring CEOs.  
                                                          
3 An alternative approach is to use the indicated departure REASON in the ExecuComp database as 
the proxy for normal retirement. However, this data field is also imperfect for this purpose. In addition 
to being imprecise, this information is available only for about 55% of CEO departures.  
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Because the timetable for CEO retirement is typically predetermined, potential reverse 
causality associated with information timing is minimized in our setting. Intuitively, it would 
be difficult for a retiring CEO to justify new and large option grants when there is apparently 
insufficient time for such options to be vested and exercised. At the same time, the retiring 
CEO’s unexercised options have to be exercised or forfeited due to the retirement clock that is 
often beyond the manager’s control. 
Second, any performance effect resulting from an outgoing CEO’s decisions should 
necessarily show up in the years surrounding his departure, so there is a clear window of 
corporate performance that allows us to trace the role of the CEO’s option positions. For non-
retiring CEOs, it is difficult to identify such a performance window; thus, their opportunistic 
behaviors and decisions at a given time point are related to complex time-varying option 
holding structures that are not observed by econometricians.  
Third and last, by examining the decisions made by retiring CEOs, we can analyze the 
types of corporate decisions that are likely to be option motivated and are likely to cause a 
performance effect. Such an examination is related to the horizon problem discussed in the 
literature. Theory suggests that managers close to retirement are associated with stronger 
compensation and equity incentives (Eaton and Rosen, 1983; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). So 
far, the evidence is mixed on managerial decisions facing a horizon problem, such as earnings 
management and R&D expenditures (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman, 
1993; Naveen, 2006). We extend this literature by also examining corporate decisions on SEOs 
and repurchases. 
3.  Data and Sample 
Our sample is based on the dataset of Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp. This dataset provides 
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detailed information on executive stock options, as well as on executive direct pay and 
turnover, for top executives in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 firms. 
Because we need to examine the firm’s performance in the years surrounding a CEO change, 
we require the CEO in our sample to be with his firm for at least two years before his 
departure, and the firm must have at least two years’ data after the departure. We confine our 
data to the period of 1994-2002. We obtain various firm financial data from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat dataset and stock-price performance data from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) data tape. In addition, we obtain the information on corporate decisions in the 
years surrounding CEO change from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database.  
After we eliminate CEOs without information on age and departure time, our total sample 
consists of 1,337 CEO turnover events. Among these events, 402 are identified as normal 
retirements, in which the departing CEO was 64 or older when he left office. Table 1 presents 
summary statistics for selected variables for retiring and non-retiring CEOs, separately. There 
are notable differences between the two groups. Apparently, retiring CEOs are older and have 
stayed with their firm longer than non-retiring CEOs. When they leave office, retiring CEOs 
are 67.7 years old on average and have stayed with their firm for 13.4 years; in contrast, non-
retiring CEOs have an average age of 55.6 and average tenure of 7.4 years. The firms of 
retiring and non-retiring CEOs are quite similar in size (measured by assets, sales, and market 
capitalization) and growth potential (measured by Tobin’s Q and book-to-market). Retiring 
CEOs are likely to perform well, and therefore their firms are associated with significantly 
higher stock returns and accounting returns in the turnover year. 
Figure 1 plots the distribution of stock options held by CEOs one year before they leave 
office. The distribution suggests a large variation in option incentives across CEOs. If options 
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are important in affecting managerial behavior and performance, the option effects should be 
strong for those who are close to retirement and who still hold many unexercised options. Table 
2 presents further statistics regarding outgoing CEOs’ option positions in their final years. We 
divide retiring CEOs and non-retiring CEOs into high- and low-option holding groups, 
respectively, based on their final year holdings at the median level. As expected, retiring CEOs 
of the high-option holding group receive fewer and fewer options as they approach retirement, 
and they exercise more options in the final year than in the previous three years combined. In 
contrast, retiring CEOs of the low-option group, who in all years have very low levels of option 
awards, exercises and holdings, do not show any notable pattern. 
4.  Empirical Results 
Different approaches are used in the finance literature to examine long-run stock-price 
performance; among these, matching-sample comparison is a common technique (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997). In this study, we also use a matching-sample approach to examine the effect of 
executive stock options on stock returns. We divide the total sample into two groups at the 
median level of CEO option holdings, and after matching for firm characteristics we compare 
abnormal stock returns between the two groups.  
Our first step is to divide the total sample into two groups of firms with different CEO 
option holdings. As a CEO approaches retirement, the pressure from unexercised stock options 
increases and his option incentives are expected to be strongest in his final year in office. 
Evidence for this point is shown in Table 2; in the final year, CEOs exercise more than twice as 
many options as they do in any earlier year. As the final year should highlight option-induced 
managerial behaviors, we divide the sample based on CEOs’ option holdings one year before 
they leave office. More specifically, we first identify the date of each CEO turnover (which we 
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denote as t=0) and determine the CEO’s option holding 12 months before this date (which we 
denote as t=-1), and we then divide the total sample according to this option holding level. 
CEOs with option holdings higher than the sample median belong to the high-option holding 
group, and others belong to the low-option holding group, which we treat as control CEOs. 
The next step is to match the two groups by firm characteristics. As usual, we perform a 
one-to-one match by size (market capitalization) and growth (book-to-market ratio). We first 
match the two groups by size: for each firm in the high-option holding group, we obtain one 
matching firm in the low-option holding group. The matching firm’s size must be in the range 
of 0.7 to 1.3 times the size of the high-option counterpart and should be the closest. In the 
matching, each observation is used only once. This single-dimension matching results in 464 
pairs of size-matched firms. We then further match these firms by book-to-market ratio. We 
also require that the matching firm’s book-to-market ratio be in the range of 0.7 to 1.3 times the 
size of, and be closest to, the high-option counterpart. The two-dimension matching procedure 
yields 431 pairs of size- and book-to-market matched firms. 
Since retiring CEOs are our main focus, we separately divide such CEOs into high- and 
low-option holding groups based on their unexercised options 12 months before their departure. 
In a similar approach, we match the two groups by size and book-to-market ratio, which leads 
to 147 pairs of size-matched retiring CEOs and 135 pairs of size- and book-to-market matched 
retiring CEOs. 
4.1   The effect of executive stock options on performance 
Our control firms are expected to capture firm heterogeneity and any abnormal changes in 
firm value associated with CEO turnover events (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). Because we 
do not match for the date of CEO change, which is essentially infeasible because of the sample 
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size constraint, we further remove market-related effects by adjusting for industry returns. Our 
performance measure is the firm’s buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) over the two-year 
period from 12 months before CEO change until 12 months after. For firm i during the period 
from 12 months before CEO turnover until month t (relative to CEO turnover), the performance 
measure is calculated as: 
    )RET()RET(BHAR Industry
t
i
t
it ττττ
+∏−+∏=
−=−=
11
1212
,    (1) 
where τ denotes the month relative to CEO turnover, RET iτ  is the firm’s stock return in month 
τ, and RET Industryτ  is the equal-weighted industry average return in month τ. Industry returns are 
calculated based on Fama-French 48 industry classification codes. For a stock and its matching 
counterpart to be included in the calculation, we require their return data to be available for at 
least one year before and one year after the turnover month. 
Table 3 presents our main results for the effect of executive stock options on stock-price 
performance. We test for the difference in BHAR between the high- and low-option holding 
firms surrounding the retiring CEO’s departure. For comparison purposes, we perform the test 
both with the unmatched sample and with the two matched samples. Panels A, B, and C present 
the results for the unmatched sample, the size-matched sample, and the size- and book-to-
market matched sample, respectively. In each panel, we report the two groups’ BHAR and their 
difference every three months for the two-year period surrounding CEO departure.  
The results are similar and quite consistent across the three panels. For the high-option 
holding group, BHAR is positive in all time intervals and the highest level occurs in the month 
of CEO departure. On the contrary, for the low-option holding group, BHAR is negative for all 
time intervals and it reaches the lowest level in the months surrounding CEO departure. It is 
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worth noting that we expect the negative abnormal returns of the control firms to reflect 
increased uncertainty due to CEO change (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). This CEO-change 
effect is most serious during the several months surrounding CEO departure.4 Compared to the 
results in Panels A and B, in Panel C the difference in BHAR is weaker though still statistically 
significant. One possible reason for this difference is the reduced sample size. 
Our key observation is that all panels indicate an inverted V-shaped difference in BHAR 
between the high- and low-option groups. While the abnormal return is higher for the high-
option holding group, the difference between the two groups peaks and becomes statistically 
significant only in the few months surrounding CEO departure; after that, the difference 
diminishes and essentially disappears within one year after CEO departure. Figures 2 to 4 show 
this observation graphically, which further highlight the difference in stock-price performance 
between the two groups. 
Taking the difference as a result of executive stock options, we obtain a strong implication 
of this finding: Executive stock options have a temporary positive effect on the share value, and 
this effect is reversed shortly after the CEO leaves office. This effect coincides with our 
observation that CEOs exercise significantly more options in their final year in office, and it 
indicates manipulated stock-price performance that helps the retiring CEO maximize capital 
                                                          
4 Previous studies document evidence of stock-price performance surrounding CEO turnover that is 
consistent with the pattern we report for the low-option-holding group. For instance, Huson, Malatesta, 
and Parrino (2004) find that “accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate 
prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the 
level of institutional shareholdings.”(pp 237-275) Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005) report that 
“volatility increases following a CEO turnover, even when the CEO leaves voluntarily and is replaced 
by someone from inside the firm. … We attribute this volatility change to increased uncertainty over the 
successor CEO's skill in managing the firm's operations.” (pp 1779-1808) 
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gains from exercising stock options. The economic benefit arising from the abnormal returns is 
also significant economically. Under the assumption that a quarter of the retiring CEO’s 
unexercised exercisable options in the final year (averaged at 0.88% of the firm’s total shares 
outstanding) are exercised, the abnormal capital gains to the retiring CEO are $2.3 million. 
On the other hand, our results do not show a sustained impact on the firm’s value; hence, 
executive stock options do not seem to benefit shareholders. Clearly, this observation does not 
support the presumably important role of stock options in improving executive working 
incentives, which, according to our data, is either negligibly weak or insignificant relative to 
the manipulation effect. This point has interesting implications for managerial incentive 
contracts. In theory, explicit incentives in an optimal compensation contract must be strongest 
for managers close to retirement, because their career concern is weakest (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992). However, when retiring managers are motivated to manipulate short-term 
share price instead of working harder to promote shareholder value, stock options – an 
increasingly important component of compensation − may not work in the way financial 
economists predict. 
Our finding of stock-price reversion in the post-CEO turnover period is particularly 
interesting. First, it is a strong indication of manipulated performance instead of information 
timing. In information timing, the opportunistic behavior of managers leads to timed option 
awards and exercises for anticipated corporate news (e.g., Yermack, 1997; Hanlon et al., 2003; 
Ittner et al., 2003; Aboody et al., 2008; Cicero, 2009). When the firm’s intrinsic value is bound 
to increase for anticipated good news or decline for anticipated bad news, there is no reason for 
the price to be revised unless the news is fabricated or manipulated. In other words, the 
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opportunistic behaviors in information timing involve reversed causality (in which it is the 
anticipated stock price change that determines the executive’s handling of stock options), but 
they do not lead to performance reversal. On the other hand, performance manipulation is not 
driven by valuable private information and should not reflect the firm’s fundamentals. Because 
of the very nature of manipulation, any manipulated stock-price performance would necessarily 
be reversed regardless of the means of manipulation. Therefore, manipulation is a necessary 
condition for performance reversal, and it does not involve reversed causality. 
Second, the observation of stock return reversal reinforces our argument that the results are 
not driven by firm or managerial heterogeneity, or any market-related factors. Figure 5 
illustrates two hypothetical scenarios of the effect of uncontrolled heterogeneity. In the first 
scenario, there is a persistent difference in firm or managerial characteristics between the high- 
and low-option groups that our matching strategy fails to remove, and the pre-turnover 
difference in BHAR is driven by such heterogeneity. In such a case, the difference should 
continue to develop after CEO turnover. In the second scenario, heterogeneity exists before 
CEO turnover and disappears after the new CEO takes office. In this case, the difference would 
have to cease to grow after the turnover event. In either case, we should not observe stock 
performance reversal. Regarding market-related factors, while they may cause certain 
differences between the two groups, these differences should be irregular and occur at irregular 
times. Again, there is no reason for the stock return pattern to be reversed and for the reversal 
to occur just after the CEO leaves office. 
As a comparison, Table 4 presents the same test with the sample of total outgoing (both 
retiring and non-retiring) CEOs. In this test, the difference in BHAR between the two groups 
does not show a clear pattern: the coefficient for the difference is either positive or negative 
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and none is statistically significant. Noting that non-retiring CEOs are the majority and account 
for 70 percent of the total sample, this result is not surprising. When the CEO is changed for 
reasons other than normal retirement, the change is usually for one of the following three 
reasons: poor health (including sudden death), poor performance, and voluntary departure for 
greener pastures. Without a predetermined timetable for terminal employment, non-retiring 
CEOs in all situations either, ex ante, do not have a plan to leave or, after the firm decides to 
change the CEO, are no longer in a position to effectively manipulate corporate decisions. 
Therefore, the results in Table 4 are not unexpected and do not conflict with the finding shown 
in Table 3.  
The results in Table 4 further imply that the pattern of the difference in BHAR between the 
high- and low-option groups reported in Table 3 is not driven by executive heterogeneity. Our 
matching strategy is designed to remove firm heterogeneity, but it does not directly deal with 
managerial heterogeneity. If option holdings depend on executive characteristics, such as 
managerial ability and risk-taking attitude, then the grouping of CEOs based on their option 
holdings would reflect such unobserved heterogeneity. For example, if more capable CEOs 
receive more options and hence are with higher option holdings, the departure of such CEOs 
would be a loss to the firm. This possibility is dismissed by the marked difference in the results 
between Table 3 and Table 4. If executive heterogeneity were the driving factor, it would have 
dictated the results for retiring CEOs and non-retiring CEOs alike. Hence we would have 
observed similar patterns of abnormal returns in both tables, and even stronger patterns in 
Table 4 because of the more efficient test with the much larger sample size.  
To further understand our results, we also examine the stock-price performance with 
respect to retiring CEOs’ stock ownership. Unlike options, the CEO’s ownership is perhaps 
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determined by his long-run investment strategy in managing his personal wealth, which is not 
constrained by any terminal period conditions. Using the same strategy we use for stock 
options, we divide the total sample into high- and low-stock ownership groups, match the two 
groups by market capitalization and book-to-market ratio, and then compare the industry-
adjusted abnormal returns between the two groups. As expected, the results of this examination 
(which we do not report) indicate no meaningful difference in stock-price performance between 
the two groups. This examination further confirms that our finding is driven by executive stock 
options. 
4.2   The effect of stock options on managerial decisions 
Having established the performance effect of stock options, we now examine corporate 
decisions in the years before the CEO leaves office. If the performance effect indeed comes 
from manipulation by the outgoing manager, there should be a link between his option position 
and certain corporate decisions in the final years that coincides with the pattern of abnormal 
returns documented in Table 3.  
In this examination, we consider four decision variables that are potential manipulative 
vehicles managers can use to influence the share price in the short run: earnings management, 
R&D expenses, share repurchases, and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Of these variables, 
earnings management is most often cited by financial and accounting economists as evidence 
of manipulative activities motivated by executive stock options. Prior studies suggest that 
CEOs are more likely to engage in earnings management when they hold more options (Cheng 
and Warfield, 2005; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007) or when they need to exercise 
more options (Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Bergstresser and Phillippon, 2006). We expect the 
high-option group of retiring CEOs to be associated with stronger earnings management. 
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R&D expenses depend on the firm’s development strategy, which balances the current 
year’s earnings and the firm’s long-term goals. When the CEO has more unexercised options, 
he is likely to have stronger incentives to boost current earnings by cutting R&D spending. We 
therefore predict lower R&D expenses for the high-option holding group. Prior studies have 
examined this horizon problem regarding R&D expenses; so far, the evidence is inconclusive.  
Repurchases and SEOs are relevant because of the well-documented regularities of equity 
market reactions to such corporate events: the firm’s stock price increases in response to a 
repurchase and decreases in response to an SEO. Hence, if the CEO wishes to support share 
price in the short term in favor of his exercising options, he is likely to be motivated to 
unnecessarily conduct share repurchases and avoid SEOs. Few researchers have examined 
these issues. One exception is Jolls (1998), who documents a link between the firm’s 
repurchase policy and executive stock options. 
Following the accounting literature, we measure earnings management by accruals, which 
are defined as the difference between earnings and cash flows from operating activities. Early 
studies use total accruals as the proxy for earnings management (e.g., Healy, 1985; Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993). More recent studies decompose total accruals into discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components and consider the discretionary component as a better proxy 
(Dechow et al., 1995). We use both in our examination. To obtain discretionary accruals, we 
follow Kothari et al. (2005) to estimate the following model: 
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where TACCRUALi,t  is firm i’s total accrual in the current year, Ai,t-1  is last year’s total assets, 
ΔREVi,t is the change of net revenue from last year, PPEi,t is the current-year gross property, 
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plant and equipment, and ROAi,t-1  is last year’s return on total assets. The residual of this cross-
sectional regression model is our estimate of discretionary accruals. 
The first two panels of Table 5 present our test for earnings management for the three fiscal 
years surrounding CEO turnover (t = –1, 0 and 1), with Panel A for total accruals and Panel B 
for discretionary accruals. The results in this table are obtained based on fiscal years; hence t=0 
is the fiscal year when the CEO is changed. In all years and with all samples, there is 
statistically no difference in the two accrual statistics between the high- and low-option holding 
groups. In particular, for the two years t = –1 and 0 when the outgoing CEO can influence the 
earnings statements, the difference is also insignificant and the sign is frequently in the 
unexpected direction. Therefore, this test does not support option-induced earnings 
management by retiring CEOs. 
Some previous studies examine CEOs’ pre-retirement years, and most find no evidence of 
earnings management (e.g., Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). Our test is consistent with this 
literature, and it further shows that options do not alter such CEOs’ decisions in this regard. 
This observation is not surprising, however. As Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) put it, 
“managerial discretion over accruals in any given year period is limited in part by the income-
inflating decisions exercised in prior years.” Even if retiring CEOs have an incentive to inflate 
earnings, it is possible that they are no longer in a position to do so effectively or freely 
because of the apparent concern that any inflated earnings by the outgoing CEO in the final 
year impose a direct burden on the successor. 
Panel C presents the test for annual R&D spending scaled by total sales. With all three 
samples, the difference in R&D expenditure between the two groups is insignificant and the 
sign is mixed. The test therefore does not show R&D expenditure manipulation associated with 
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executive stock options. Because cutting R&D expenditure may hamper the strategic 
development that the firm already has in place, the concern of potential successors, who are 
mostly insider executives, may well limit such manipulation by the outgoing CEO.  
Table 6 presents our comparison for SEOs and share repurchases between the high- and 
low-option groups. We calculate the number of SEO and repurchase events during the four-
year period surrounding (two years before and two years after) CEO turnover.5 In the upper 
panel, the frequency of SEOs shows a pattern consistent with the effort of the high-option 
group in price support. This pattern is more evident with the size- and book-to-market matched 
sample. In the 12 months one year before CEO departure, ten firms in the low-option group 
conduct an SEO, while only five in the high-option group do so. This difference suggests that 
CEOs with more options tend to avoid issuing new equity in order to minimize downward 
pressures on the share price. In the 12 months before CEO departure, the frequency of SEOs 
becomes similar between the two groups. In this period, the high-option group has high 
abnormal returns (which encourages the issuing of new equity). This observation is also 
consistent with the outgoing CEO’s influence in supporting the share price. 
On the other hand, in the two years after the new CEO is in control, the difference in the 
SEO frequency between the two groups is reversed: while it increases with the high-option 
group, it declines dramatically with the low-option group. Consequently, the high-option group 
conducted many more SEOs than the low-option group in the two years immediately after the 
new CEO takes office. This reversed difference may suggest that the new CEO is compensating 
for the “skipped” SEOs in the previous years. 
                                                          
5 We extend the examination period for repurchases and SEOs to four years surrounding CEO 
departure due to a concern with the low frequency of such events.  
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The lower panel presents our comparison for share repurchases. Consistent with the result 
for SEOs, the difference in the number of repurchases between the two groups also indicates 
price support from the high-option holding group. Consider the size and book-to-market 
matched sample. In the 12 months before CEO departure, 24 repurchases were conducted by 
firms in the high-option group and 19 were conducted by firms in the low-option group. This 
difference is reversed after CEO departure; in the 12 months before CEO departure, while the 
number of repurchases jumps to 26 for the low-option group, it drops slightly to 22 for the 
high-option group. 
We further run regressions to test the stock-option effects on SEOs and share repurchases. 
Table 7 reports the results for our test for SEOs. The first six columns present probit 
regressions, where the dependent variable equals one if one or more SEOs are conducted in the 
specified period before CEO turnover, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the dummy 
variable for the high-option holding group captures the option effect. Market capitalization, 
stock return performance, and debt ratio are controlled in the regressions. Consistent with the 
observation from the statistics in Table 6, the coefficient on the dummy variable is negative in 
all regressions, and it becomes statistically marginally significant with the subsample matched 
for size and book-to-market.  
The remaining three columns in Table 7 present OLS regressions for the change in the 
number of SEOs from the two-year period before CEO turnover to the two-year period after. 
The control variables in these regressions are in difference, calculated as the corresponding 
change from the pre-turnover period to the post-turnover period. The economic rationale for 
these regressions is as follows: if fewer SEOs in the two-year period before CEO change are 
due to the outgoing CEO’s manipulation, we expect some compensating actions by the new 
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CEO to raise more equity capital in the post-CEO change period. Therefore, we expect the 
coefficient on the high-option holding dummy to be positive. Consistent with this expectation, 
the coefficient is positive and statistically highly significant in all three regressions. These three 
regressions are essentially a difference-in-differences test, which provides a robust estimation 
uncontaminated by potential firm heterogeneity. We consider the results of this test as evidence 
of SEO manipulation by the outgoing CEO, motivated by executive stock options.  
Table 8 presents our test for share repurchases, using the same approach as for SEOs. 
Consistent with the statistics from Table 6, the coefficient on the high-option dummy is 
positive in the first six regressions. However, except in one regression, the coefficient is 
insignificant. In the remaining regressions, the difference-in-differences test identifies no 
meaningful difference in the coefficient between the high- and low-option groups. Therefore, 
this test does not indicate any compensating decisions by the new CEO in conducting share 
repurchases. 
4.3   Discussion 
We interpret the inverted V-shaped pattern of abnormal stock returns surrounding CEO 
departures as evidence of manipulated performance motivated by CEO option incentives. We 
now discuss some further issues regarding our finding and interpretation, which have direct 
implications for possible alternative mechanisms behind the finding. 
First, our test is based on the presumed concern of the departing CEO about his unexercised 
stock options that are to lapse shortly after retirement. However, in the real world not all 
retiring CEOs face such a terminal-period incentive problem. Some retired CEOs continue 
staying with the firm and some even become the board chairmen, who are unlikely to have an 
urgent need to exit from their option positions. Even for such CEOs, their option incentives can 
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still be strong because after leaving the top management position, they no longer run the 
company and their influence on corporate decisions would be substantially reduced. To the 
extent that such retiring CEOs have weaker incentives to manipulate the share value, the 
presence of such CEOs in our sample should have weakened our results. 
In addition, as we note earlier, due to limitations of data we are unable to obtain a clean 
sample of CEO normal retirements. Our sample inevitably includes some forced turnovers or 
unexpected voluntary departures. The CEOs in such departures are likely to face more 
constraints in dealing with unexercised stock options and making corporate decisions before 
their departure than those in a normal retirement. Hence, such CEOs should have weaker 
incentives to manipulate performance and it should be more difficult for them to effectively 
manipulate performance. Therefore, data imperfections in this regard should also have 
weakened our results.  
Second, the interpretation of our finding as evidence of performance manipulation (in 
contrast to information timing as in previous studies) is based on an important assumption: the 
departure date of the retiring CEO is predetermined. This assumption should hold for typical 
normal retirements in which the change in top management is anticipated and usually well 
planned. When the old CEO is expected to retire, there should be little uncertainty in the final 
year as when his contract expires. To prepare for the management change, it is also necessary 
for the board to decide on the successor carefully and in advance, thus leaving sufficient time 
for a smooth transition and avoiding any unexpected outcomes. 
Nevertheless, in some circumstances, the departure date can still be influenced or 
manipulated by the retiring CEO. To the extent that the departure date is manipulated by the 
CEO, our finding would be a result of manipulated timing of retirement rather than 
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manipulated performance. To evaluate this possibility, it is important to note that the option 
incentives in the terminal period are supposed to motivate the CEO to leave office later rather 
than sooner. This means that the desirable manipulation of a departure date is to delay the 
departure. There are two situations in which the retiring CEO may have a legitimate reason to 
delay his departure. In the first situation, the firm has difficulty in appointing the successor so 
the retiring CEO needs to stay beyond his pre-determined departure date. Given the nature of 
such delayed departures, the chance for and extent of CEO manipulation should be limited. In 
the second situation, there is some flexibility in the actual departure date relative to the 
officially announced departure date. However, as long as the official departure date is not 
manipulated, on which our test is based, the variation in the actual departure date arising from 
the departing CEO’s intended delay becomes irrelevant. Therefore, although manipulated 
departure dates are possible, they are unlikely to be common with normal retirements and 
hence should not pose a serious challenge to our interpretation. 
Third, we have ignored a possible alternative explanation of the inverted V-shaped 
abnormal stock returns surrounding CEO departure: it is a combined effect of the pre-departure 
positive abnormal returns of some firms and the post-departure negative abnormal returns of 
some other firms. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that such firms present in our 
sample and have affected our results, we explain below: (i) our finding is unlikely to be driven 
by this effect, and (ii) this alternative explanation does not necessarily conflict with our 
interpretation.  
A direct check for this possibility is to examine the correlation between a firm’s abnormal 
return before CEO departure and the same firm’s abnormal return after the departure. 
Consistent with the notion of performance manipulation, this correlation is negative for the 
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abnormal returns between one-year before and one-year after CEO departure. However, the 
significance level of this correlation is low and it declines as the performance window shrinks. 
The low significance level and changing pattern of this correlation are not unexpected. Because 
the correlation test requires each firm’s share value to peak around the departure date, it is 
bound to be more restrictive and thus weaker than our difference-in-difference test. Indeed, for 
various reasons, the effect of manipulation can vary greatly in magnitude, shape, and peaking 
time. Such variation becomes even greater with the pair-wise differences that depend on the 
underlying patterns of both the high- and low-option holding groups. 
While the negative pair-wise correlation is consistent with our interpretation, it does not 
reject the possibility that some firms only contribute to one side of the abnormal returns. Our 
empirical strategy has ruled out outliers or missing-variable problems for this possibility. 
However, some corporate decisions can cause such a one-sided performance effect. For 
instance, when the retiring CEO pushes for a stock repurchase shortly before his departure or 
delay a seasoned equity offering until after his departure while he does acquire supportive 
inside information, the performance effect will be sustainable and consequently contribute to 
one side of the abnormal returns. Similarly, when the CEO manipulates corporate news release 
as in Aboody and Kasznik (2000), the performance effect will be one-sided if the news is 
information based instead of fabricated. It is difficult for us to have a clear picture of the 
presence of such scenarios. However, based on our discussion in the previous section about the 
effect of managerial decisions, we suspect that their role is limited. Nevertheless, as long as the 
CEO’s departure date is predetermined, the corporate decisions in those scenarios are a 
manipulated outcome no matter whether the resulting performance is reversed. 
5.  Conclusion 
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By examining stock-price performance for a sample of firms with the retiring CEO, we 
document evidence of manipulated stock returns motivated by executive stock options. In our 
examination, we divide retiring CEOs into high- and low-option holding groups and, after 
matching for firm characteristics and adjusting for industry returns, we compare stock-price 
performance in the two years surrounding (one year before and one year after) CEO departure. 
We find higher buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the high-option group than for the low-
option group in the year before CEO departure. This difference is reversed after the CEO 
leaves office and essentially disappears within one year after the CEO’s departure. The inverted 
V-shaped BHAR of the high-option group relative to the low-option group coincides with the 
timing of CEO change, which cannot be explained by firm heterogeneity, CEO heterogeneity, 
or market-related variables. We interpret this finding as evidence of option-induced 
manipulation of stock price by the outgoing CEO.  
Previous studies have examined opportunistic patterns of executive stock option awards 
and exercises, focusing on information timing. Others have also examined manipulated 
corporate decisions motivated by anticipated option grants and exercises. Contributing to this 
growing literature, we present the first direct evidence of manipulated stock-price performance 
associated with executive stock options. Our results suggest that retiring CEOs can effectively 
manipulate stock price and, by exercising options at high share prices, realize economically 
significant abnormal returns.  
On the other hand, in this study we are unable to draw a conclusion about corporate 
decisions that retiring CEOs may use to effectively manipulate share price. We find a 
significant pattern of SEOs surrounding CEO retirement in support of price manipulation. 
However, given the infrequency of SEO events, the effect of this pattern is too small to account 
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for the significant abnormal returns. In addition to corporate decisions, there may be other 
channels for manipulation, such as unjustified favorable corporate news and, possibly, insider 
trading. We believe that a separate study is necessary to carefully examine this issue.  
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
 
We obtain corporate executive data from Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp and company financial data from 
COMPUSTAT. After we eliminate observations with missing data, our sample consists of 1,337 CEO turnovers 
for the period 1994-2002. We divide CEO departure events into two categories: normal retirement and others. A 
CEO departure is considered to be normal retirement if the outgoing CEO is 64 or older in the year of CEO 
turnover. This table presents summary statistics for selected CEO and firm variables for retiring CEOs and non-
retiring CEOs, separately. All variables are reported for the fiscal year of CEO change. Grants and exercises of 
stock options are reported as the percentage of firm’s total shares outstanding. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market 
value of the firm’s common stock plus the book value of debt over the firm’s book value of total assets. 
 
 
  Observation Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation 
A. Retiring CEOs 
CEO age (years) 402 67.60 66 64  87  4.65 
Tenure as CEO (years) 358 13.42 10 1  54  10.67 
Grants of CEO stock options (%) 347 0.09 0.00 0.00  4.15  0.28 
Unexercised CEO stock options (%) 346 0.69 0.39 0.00  13.51  1.07 
Total assets  ($million) 401 12,165 1,692 28  621,764  47,694 
Sales ($million) 401 5,331 1,523 10  165,639  14,862 
Market capitalization ($million) 400 8,049 1,411 18  397,832  29,579 
Book-to-market ratio 394 0.57 0.48 0.02  8.61  0.64 
Stock return (%) 392 12.54 6.65 -88.96  1026.50  63.20 
Return on assets (%) 401 3.71 4.48 -79.88  38.67  9.44 
Tobin’s Q 394 1.77 1.40 0.62  12.48  1.28 
B.  Non-retiring CEOs 
CEO age (years) 935 55.62 57 29  63  5.93 
Tenure as CEO (years) 862 7.37 6 1  43  5.51 
Grants of CEO stock options (%) 842 0.11 0.00 0.00  10.22  0.43 
Unexercised CEO stock options (%) 842 0.91 0.47 0.00  64.57  2.49 
Total assets  ($million) 928 10,222 1,378 6  902,210  46,067 
Sales ($million) 924 4,832 1,229 0  180,557  11,850 
Market capitalization ($million) 926 6,569 1,009 2  422,640  23,345 
Book-to-market ratio 869 0.67 0.49 0.01  12.11  0.89 
Stock return (%) 880 2.18 -5.00 -97.23  632.95  63.06 
Return on assets (%) 927 -5.42 2.14 -584.48  36.33  36.14 
Tobin’s Q 869 1.85 1.35 0.60 11.22 1.38 
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Table 2 
Option awards, exercises, and holdings of outgoing CEOs 
 
This table reports mean option grants, exercises and holdings of outgoing CEOs for the four years before CEO 
turnover. The sample is described in Table 1. All option variables are reported as the percentage of total shares 
outstanding at the fiscal year end. Panel A presents the statistics for the subsample of 402 retiring CEOs, and 
Panel B for the subsample of 935 non-retiring CEOs. In both panels, CEOs are further divided into high- and low-
option holding groups based on their option holdings at the year end before the turnover year (t = –1). Hence, in 
each panel, the high- (low-) option holding group consists of observations with CEO option holding above (below) 
the median. 
 
 
 Year as of CEO turnover 
 -3 -2 -1 0 
A.  Retiring CEOs 
High-option holding CEOs     
Option grants (%) 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.13 
Exercised options (%) 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.17 
Unexercised exercisable options (%) 0.77 0.85 0.94 0.88 
Unexercised unexercisable options (%) 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.24 
Low-option holding CEOs     
Option grants (%) 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 
Exercised options (%) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Unexercised exercisable options (%) 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.13 
Unexercised unexercisable options (%) 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 
B.  Non-retiring CEOs 
High-option holding CEOs     
Option grants (%) 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.14 
Exercised options (%) 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.22 
Unexercised exercisable options (%) 0.87 0.95 1.11 1.01 
Unexercised unexercisable options (%) 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.30 
Low-option holding CEOs     
Option grants (%) 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 
Exercised options (%) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Unexercised exercisable options (%) 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.19 
Unexercised unexercisable options (%) 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.08 
 35 
 
 
Table 3 
Stock-Price Performance:  Retiring CEOs 
 
This table presents the test for stock-price performance for retiring CEOs in the two-year period surrounding (one 
year before and one year after) CEO departure. The sample of retiring CEOs is described in Table 1. Retiring 
CEOs are divided into high- and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their 
departure. The high- (low-) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the 
median. Then, firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size and market-to-book ratio. The 
unmatched sample consists of 192 pairs of observations, the size-matched sample consists of 147 pairs of 
observations, and the size and market-to-book-matched sample consists of 135 pairs of observations. We measure 
stock-price performance using industry-adjusted buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR). Industry returns are 
calculated based on Fama-French 48 industry classification codes. Beginning from 12 months prior to CEO 
departure, we calculate BHAR for every three months for each group. The performance windows indicate the 
beginning month and the ending month relative to CEO departure. The difference in BHAR between the two 
groups and the t-statistic are reported. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 
Performance window  
High-option 
holding group 
Low-option 
holding group 
Difference 
( high–low ) 
t-statistic for 
difference 
Pairs of 
observations 
A.  BHAR since 12 months before CEO departure:  Firms unmatched 
[-12, -9]     2.21    -1.49       3.70  1.58  192 
[-12, -6]     3.41    -2.41       5.82**  2.00  192 
[-12, -3]     4.77    -3.83**       8.59** 2.18  192 
[-12, 0]   11.45**    -5.32**     16.77***  3.00  192 
[-12, +3]     8.22    -4.62     12.83*  1.72  192 
[-12, +6]     7.10    -4.19     11.29*  1.77  192 
[-12, +9]     7.12    -2.90     10.01  1.63  192 
[-12, +12]     6.60    -4.10     10.70  1.50  192 
B.  BHAR since 12 months before CEO departure:  Firms matched by size 
[-12, -9]    0.63    -1.41       2.04  0.91  147 
[-12, -6]    2.19    -3.02       5.20*  1.78  147 
[-12, -3]    2.02    -5.05**       7.08*  1.72  147 
[-12, 0]  10.01*    -7.05***     17.05***  2.81  147 
[-12, +3]    7.63    -6.70**     14.33  1.60  147 
[-12, +6]    3.42    -4.02       7.44  1.24  147 
[-12, +9]    5.74    -3.28       9.02  1.43  147 
[-12, +12]    6.68    -2.21       8.90  1.24  147 
C.  BHAR since 12 months before CEO departure:  Firms matched by size and book-to-market ratio 
[-12, -9]    0.33    -1.05       1.38  0.58  135 
[-12, -6]    0.32    -1.80       2.12  0.72  135 
[-12, -3]    0.34    -2.90       3.24  0.91  135 
[-12, 0]    7.89*    -5.25**     13.14**  2.52  135 
[-12, +3]    4.00    -4.92       8.92  1.60  135 
[-12, +6]    5.71    -4.36     10.07*  1.77  135 
[-12, +9]    5.22    -2.07       7.29  1.16  135 
[-12, +12]    3.24    -3.84       7.08  0.99  135 
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Table 4 
Stock-Price Performance:  All CEOs 
 
This table presents the test for stock-price performance for all retiring and non-retiring CEOs in the two-year 
period surrounding (one year before and one year after) CEO departure. The sample is described in Table 1. CEOs 
are divided into high- and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their 
departure. The high- (low-) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the 
median. Then, firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size and market-to-book ratio. The 
unmatched sample consists of 622 pairs of observations, the size-matched sample consists of 464 pairs of 
observations, and the size- and market-to-book-matched sample consists of 431 pairs of observations. We measure 
stock-price performance using industry-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). Industry returns are 
calculated based on Fama-French 48 industry classification codes. Beginning from 12 months prior to CEO 
departure, we calculate BHAR for every three months for each group. The performance windows indicate the 
beginning month and the ending month relative to CEO departure. The difference in BHAR between the two 
groups and the t-statistic are reported. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
 
 
Performance window 
High-option 
holding group 
Low-option 
holding group 
Difference 
( high – low ) 
t-statistic for 
difference 
Pairs of 
observations 
A.  BHAR since 12 months before CEO departure:  Firms unmatched 
[-12, -9]   -1.03    -1.50*  0.47  0.36  622 
[-12, -6]   -2.62*    -2.87***  0.25  0.14  622 
[-12, -3]   -4.20**    -4.84***  0.64  0.26  622 
[-12, 0]   -7.61***    -6.70***  -0.91  -0.30  622 
[-12, +3]   -8.97***    -8.39***  -0.58  -0.15  622 
[-12, +6]   -9.34***    -6.92***  -2.42  -0.64  622 
[-12, +9]   -7.81**    -5.57**  -2.24  -0.51  622 
[-12, +12]   -9.85***    -5.66**  -4.19  -0.95  622 
B.  BHAR since 12 months before CEO departure:  Firms matched by size 
[-12, -9]   -0.44    -0.87   0.43  0.28  464 
[-12, -6]   -1.70    -2.38*  0.68  0.31  464 
[-12, -3]   -4.95**    -3.85**  -1.09  -0.40  464 
[-12, 0]   -7.94***    -6.18***  -1.77  -0.55  464 
[-12, +3] -10.23***    -6.50**  -3.73  -0.97  464 
[-12, +6]   -7.15***    -4.77*  -2.38  -0.53  464 
[-12, +9]   -4.42    -2.31  -2.10  -0.39  464 
[-12, +12]   -6.42    -2.09  -4.33  -0.82  464 
C.  BHAR since 12 months before CEO departure:  Firms matched by size and book-to-market ratio 
[-12, -9]   -0.86    -0.64  -0.22  -0.14  431 
[-12, -6]   -1.84    -2.68**  0.84  0.39  431 
[-12, -3]   -3.81*    -4.53***  0.72  0.26  431 
[-12, 0]   -7.26***    -7.45***   0.18  0.05  431 
[-12, +3] -10.00***    -9.72***  -0.28  -0.07  431 
[-12, +6]   -9.32***    -7.69***  -1.63  -0.38  431 
[-12, +9]   -7.16**    -5.64**  -1.53  -0.33  431 
[-12, +12]   -8.23**    -5.55**  -2.67  -0.51  431 
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Table 5 
Accruals and R&D Expenditure Surrounding CEO Retirement 
 
This table presents the test for annual accruals and R&D expenditure for firms with a retiring CEO in the three-
year period from one fiscal year before (t = –1) to one fiscal year after (t =1) CEO turnover, with Panel A for total 
accruals, Panel B for discretionary accruals, and Panel C for R&D expenditure. The sample of retiring CEOs is 
described in Table 1. CEOs are divided into high- and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 
12 months before their departure. The high- (low-) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding 
above (below) the median. Then, firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size and market-to-
book ratio. The unmatched sample consists of 192 pairs of observations, the size-matched sample consists of 147 
pairs of observations, and the size- and market-to-book-matched sample consists of 135 pairs of observations. 
Total accruals are calculated as income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows scaled by year-
beginning total assets. Discretionary accruals are obtained as the residual from regression model (2). R&D 
expenditure is annual R&D expenses scaled by total sales. t-statistics for the difference between the high- and 
low-option holding groups are reported. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
 
 
 
  High-option 
holding group 
Low-option 
holding group 
Difference   
(high – low) 
t-statistic for 
difference 
Pairs of 
observations 
A.  Total accruals 
Unmatched: 
Year -1 -0.051 -0.043 -0.008 -1.14  178 
Year 0 (CEO departure) -0.063 -0.054 -0.009 -1.20  178 
Year 1 -0.068 -0.058 -0.010 -1.42  177 
 
Matched by size: 
Year -1 -0.049 -0.043 -0.005 -0.69  137 
Year 0 (CEO departure) -0.061 -0.054 -0.007 -0.88  137 
Year 1 -0.060 -0.059 -0.001 -0.08  136 
 
Matched by size and book-to-market ratio: 
Year -1 -0.043 -0.040 -0.003 -0.37  122 
Year 0 (CEO departure) -0.056 -0.054 -0.001 -0.14  122 
Year 1 -0.064 -0.057 -0.008 -0.84  122 
B.  Discretionary accruals 
Unmatched: 
Year -1 0.012 0.010 0.001 0.11  175 
Year 0 (CEO departure) -0.013 -0.007 -0.006 -0.50  173 
Year 1 -0.009 -0.011 0.001 0.08  172 
 
Matched by size:      
Year -1 0.011 0.015 -0.005 -0.32  136 
Year 0 (CEO departure) -0.018 -0.003 -0.015 -1.13  134 
Year 1 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 0.26  134 
 
Matched by size and book-to-market ratio: 
Year -1 0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.41 121 
Year 0 (CEO departure) -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.10 118 
Year 1 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.16 120 
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C.  R&D expenses 
Unmatched:      
Year -1 0.021 0.016 0.004 0.95  193 
Year 0 (CEO departure) 0.020 0.016 0.004 0.95  193 
Year 1 0.021 0.019 0.002 0.44  193 
 
Matched by size:      
Year -1 0.021 0.015 0.006 1.16  148 
Year 0 (CEO departure) 0.019 0.014 0.006 1.18  148 
Year 1 0.021 0.017 0.004 0.64  148 
 
Matched by size and book-to-market ratio: 
Year -1 0.017 0.018 -0.001 -0.16  134 
Year 0 (CEO departure) 0.015 0.017 -0.002 -0.41  134 
Year 1 0.015 0.019 -0.004 -0.67  134 
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Table 6 
SEOs and Repurchases Surrounding CEO Retirement:  Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the number of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and share repurchase events surrounding the departure of retiring CEOs. The sample of 
retiring CEOs is described in Table 1. CEOs are divided into high- and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their departure. 
The high- (low-) option holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the median. Their firms are matched, one for one, between the two 
groups by size and market-to-book ratio. The unmatched sample consists of 193 pairs of observations, the size-matched sample consists of 147 pairs of 
observations, and the size- and market-to-book-matched sample consists of 135 pairs of observations. The information on SEO and repurchase events is obtained 
from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database.  
 
 Unmatched  Matched by size  Matched by size and book-to-market ratio 
  High option Low option Pairs of observation High option Low option 
Pairs of 
observation High option Low option 
Pairs of 
observation 
SEOs:          
Months -24 to -12 8 11 192 8 11 147 5 10 135 
Months -12 to 0 (CEO departure) 7 6 192 7 6 147 6 5 135 
Months 0 to 12 12 2 192 12 2 147 9 2 135 
Months 12 to 24 8 3 192 8 3 147 7 1 135 
          
Repurchases:          
Months -24 to -12 27 21 192 27 21 147 24 19 135 
Months -12 to 0 (CEO departure) 23 30 192 23 30 147 22 26 135 
Months 0 to 12 23 25 192 23 25 147 22 21 135 
Months 12 to 24 24 25 192 24 25 147 22 22 135 
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Table 7 
Regressions for SEOs Surrounding CEO Retirement 
 
This table presents the regressions for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the years surrounding CEO retirement. The sample of retiring CEOs is described in 
Table 1. CEOs are divided into high- and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their departure. The high- (low-) option 
holding group consists of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the median. Their firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size or style 
(i.e., size and market-to-book ratio). The information on SEOs is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The first six columns present probit 
regressions, where the dependent variable equals one if one or more SEOs are conducted in the specified period before CEO turnover, and zero otherwise. Market 
capitalization, stock return, and debt ratio are annual data for the year one year before the turnover year. The remaining three columns present OLS regressions for 
the change in the number of SEOs from the two-year period before CEO turnover to the two-year period after turnover. Market capitalization, stock return, and 
debt ratio are in difference, calculated as the corresponding change from the pre-turnover period to the post-turnover period. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
 Probability of SEO during  
months -24 to -12  
Probability of SEO during  
months -24 to 0  
Change in SEOs  
from months (-24 to 0) to months (0 to 24) 
  
Independent variables (Unmatched) 
(Size-
matched) 
(Style-
matched)  (Unmatched) 
(Size-
matched) 
(Style-
matched)  (Unmatched) 
(Size-
matched) 
(Style-
matched) 
High-option holding dummy -0.319 
(-1.40) 
 
-0.312 
(-1.26) 
 
-0.433 
(-1.59) 
  
-0.171 
(-0.89) 
 
-0.299 
(-1.37) 
 
-0.363 
(-1.53) 
  
0.115** 
(2.31) 
 
0.152** 
(2.56) 
 
0.150*** 
(2.67) 
 
ln (Market capitalization) 0.040 
(0.60) 
 
0.045 
(0.50) 
 
0.012 
(0.12) 
  
0.021 
(0.36) 
 
0.030 
(0.37) 
 
0.011 
(0.12) 
  
0.064 
(1.45) 
 
0.062 
(1.17) 
 
0.048 
(0.92) 
 
Stock return 
 
 
0.149 
(1.01) 
 
0.195 
(1.33) 
 
0.474* 
(1.79) 
  
0.255** 
(2.15) 
 
0.212 
(1.57) 
 
0.638*** 
(2.63) 
  
0.075 
(1.43) 
 
0.033 
(0.53) 
 
0.077 
(1.23) 
 
Debt ratio -0.319 
(-1.40) 
 
0.885 
(1.14) 
 
0.777 
(0.88) 
  
1.135* 
(1.89) 
 
1.109* 
(1.64) 
 
0.652 
(0.83) 
  
0.028 
(0.11) 
 
-0.060 
(-0.20) 
 
0.416 
(1.26) 
 
Constant -1.974*** 
(-3.43) 
 
-1.914*** 
(-2.77) 
 
-1.712** 
(-2.20) 
  
-1.637*** 
(-3.34) 
 
-1.642*** 
(-2.71) 
 
-1.507** 
(-2.22) 
  
-0.104*** 
(-2.87) 
 
-0.109** 
(-2.49) 
 
-0.125*** 
(-2.92) 
 
Scaled or adjusted R-squared 0.014 0.013 0.025  0.021 0.020 0.038  0.016 0.018 0.025 
Number of observations 369 280 258  369 280 258  331 249 235 
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Table 8 
Regressions for Repurchases Surrounding CEO Retirement 
 
This table presents the regressions for repurchases in the years surrounding CEO retirement. The sample of retiring CEOs is described in Table 1. CEOs are 
divided into high- and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months before their departure. The high- (low-) option holding group consists 
of CEOs with an option holding above (below) the median. Their firms are matched, one for one, between the two groups by size or style (i.e., size and market-to-
book ratio). The information on stock repurchases is obtained from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The first six columns present probit regressions, 
where the dependent variable equals one if one or more repurchases are conducted in the specified period before CEO turnover, and zero otherwise. Market 
capitalization, stock return, and debt ratio are annual data for the year one year before the turnover year. The remaining three columns present OLS regressions for 
the change in the number of repurchases from the two-year period before CEO turnover to the two-year period after turnover. Market capitalization, stock return, 
and debt ratio are in difference, calculated as the corresponding change from the pre-turnover period to the post-turnover period. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
 Probability of repurchase 
during months -24 to -12  
Probability of repurchase 
during months -24 to 0  
Change in repurchases 
from months (-24 to 0) to months (0 to 24) 
  
Independent variables (Unmatched) 
(Size-
matched) 
(Style-
matched)  (Unmatched) 
(Size-
matched) 
(Style-
matched)  (Unmatched) 
(Size-
matched) 
(Style-
matched) 
High-option dummy 0.284* 
(1.65) 
 
0.286 
(1.47) 
 
0.198 
(0.98) 
  
0.196 
(1.32) 
 
0.148 
(0.89) 
 
0.122 
(0.70) 
  
0.007 
(0.08) 
 
-0.026 
(-0.27) 
 
0.020 
(0.21) 
 
ln (Market capitalization) 0.088* 
(1.69) 
 
0.138** 
(2.02) 
 
0.090 
(1.15) 
  
0.062 
(1.34) 
 
0.121** 
(2.06) 
 
0.093 
(1.37) 
  
-0.013 
(-0.17) 
 
0.010 
(0.11) 
 
-0.070 
(-0.80) 
 
Stock return 
 
 
0.023 
(0.17) 
 
0.023 
(0.14) 
 
0.432* 
(1.87) 
  
-0.037 
(-0.30) 
 
-0.043 
(-0.29) 
 
0.330 
(1.56) 
  
-0.084 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.026 
(-0.25) 
 
0.034 
(0.33) 
 
Debt ratio -1.538** 
(-2.43) 
 
-1.050 
(-1.46) 
 
-1.345* 
(-1.72) 
  
-1.919*** 
(-3.61) 
 
-1.430** 
(-2.39) 
 
-2.653*** 
(-3.83) 
  
-0.652 
(-1.49) 
 
-0.482 
(-0.98) 
 
-1.389** 
(-2.54) 
 
Constant -1.561*** 
(-3.56) 
 
-2.054*** 
(-3.84) 
 
-1.668*** 
(-2.82) 
  
-0.769** 
(-2.02) 
 
-1.285*** 
(-2.84) 
 
-0.913* 
(-1.81) 
  
0.015 
(0.25) 
 
0.015 
(0.21) 
 
0.017 
(0.24) 
 
Scaled or adjusted R-squared 0.028 0.028 0.031  0.044 0.039 0.075  0.003 -0.012 0.012 
Number of observations 369 280 258  369 280 258  331 281 235 
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Figure 1.  Distribution of CEO Stock Option Holdings 
 
This figure plots the distribution of stock options held by outgoing CEOs one year before their departure, 
separately for retiring CEOs and non-retiring CEOs. Retiring CEOs are defined as those who leave office at age 
64 or above. Our sample is from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp for the period 1994-2002, which consists of 
402 retiring CEOs and 935 non-retiring CEOs. Option holdings are reported as the percentage of the firm’s total 
shares outstanding. 
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Figure 2.  Abnormal Returns Surrounding CEO Retirement:  The Unmatched Sample 
 
This figure shows stock-price performance for the unmatched sample of retiring CEOs in the two-year period 
surrounding (one year before and one year after) CEO departure. Retiring CEOs are those who leave office at age 
64 or above. The sample consists of 384 CEOs, who are divided into high- and low-option holding groups based 
on their option holdings 12 months prior to their departure. The high- (low-) option holding group includes CEOs 
with option holdings above (below) the median. We measure stock-price performance by industry-adjusted buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) beginning from 12 months before CEO departure. The upper panel shows 
BHAR for the high- and low-option holding groups, separately, and the lower panel shows the difference in 
BHAR between the two groups. 
       High-option 
       Low-option  
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Figure 3.  Abnormal Returns Surrounding CEO Retirement:  The Size-Matched Sample 
 
This figure shows stock-price performance for the size-matched sample of retiring CEOs in the two-year period 
surrounding (one year before and one year after) CEO departure. Retiring CEOs are those who leave office at age  
64 or above. We divide CEOs into high- and low-option holding groups based on their option holdings 12 months 
prior to their departure. The high- (low-) option holding group thus consists of CEOs with option holdings above 
(below) the median. We then match firms between the two groups by market capitalization. The resulting sample 
consists of 147 pairs of size-matched firms. We measure stock-price performance by industry-adjusted buy-and-
hold abnormal return (BHAR) beginning from 12 months before CEO departure. The upper panel shows BHAR 
for the high- and low-option holding group, separately, and the lower panel shows the difference in BHAR 
between the two groups. 
High-option 
Low-option 
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Figure 4.  Abnormal Returns Surrounding CEO Retirement:  The Size- and Market-to-Book-Matched 
Sample 
 
This figure shows stock-price performance for the size- and market-to-book-matched sample of retiring CEOs in 
the two-year period surrounding (one year before and one year after) CEO departure. Retiring CEOs are those 
who leave office at age 64 or above. We divide CEOs into high- and low-option holding groups based on their 
option holdings 12 months prior to their departure. The high- (low-) option holding group thus consists of CEOs 
with option holdings above (below) the median. We then match firms between the two groups by market 
capitalization and market-to-book ratio. The resulting sample consists of 135 pairs of size- and market-to-book- 
matched firms. We measure stock-price performance by industry-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
beginning from 12 months before CEO departure. The upper panel shows BHAR for the high- and low-option 
holding groups, separately, and the lower panel shows the difference in BHAR between the two groups. 
       High-option 
       Low-option  
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                                             Case A.  Persistent Firm and Managerial Heterogeneity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
                                                
 
 
                                    Case B.  Pre-CEO Turnover Firm and Managerial Heterogeneity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
                
 
 
Figure 5.  Difference in BHAR in the Presence of Firm and Managerial Heterogeneity 
 
This figure illustrates two patterns of the difference in BHAR between the high- and low-option holding groups in 
the presence of firm and managerial heterogeneity. The dotted line represents the case of manipulated stock price 
performance. Case A shows the case in which the performance difference is driven by persistent firm and 
managerial heterogeneity. Case B shows the case in which the performance difference is driven by pre-CEO 
turnover firm and managerial heterogeneity that disappears after the CEO is changed. 
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